Lobbying Transparency: The Limits of EU Monitory Democracy by Dinan, William
Politics and Governance (ISSN: 2183–2463)
2021, Volume 9, Issue 1, Pages 237–247
DOI: 10.17645/pag.v9i1.3936
Article
Lobbying Transparency: The Limits of EU Monitory Democracy
William Dinan
Division of Communication, Media & Culture, Faculty of Arts & Humanities, University of Stirling, Stirling, FK9 4LA, UK;
E-Mail: william.dinan1@stir.ac.uk
Submitted: 15 December 2020 | Accepted: 25 February 2021 | Published: 31 March 2021
Abstract
This article examines the origins and current operation of the EU’s lobbying transparency register and offers a critical review
of the drivers and politics associated with lobbying reform in Brussels. The analysis considers the dynamics of political com-
munication in EU institutions and draws on concepts of the fourth estate, the public sphere and monitory democracy to
illustrate the particular challenges around lobbying transparency and opening up governance processes to wider scrutiny,
and wider participation, at the EU level. This article draws upon interviews, official data and participant observation of
some of the deliberations on lobbying transparency dating back to the 2005 ETI. The analysis is brought up to date by
examining the data within the Transparency Register itself, both substantively in terms of the kinds of information dis-
closed and in relation to trends around disclosures and registration, since the register was launched over a decade ago.
The article concludes with a critical appraisal of the evolving issue culture relating to lobbying transparency in Brussels as
well as recommendations for the development of the Transparency Register itself.
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1. Introduction
InMarch 2005, the European Transparency Initiative (ETI)
was launched, aimed at addressing concerns about the
accountability of EU institutions. One dimension of the
ETI was the proposed creation of a register of lobby-
ists (first called the Register of Interest Representatives,
rebranded in 2011 as the Transparency Register) thatwas
intended to shed some light on how influence is brought
to bear in EU decision making. One of the concerns
expressed in the European Commission’s initial Green
Paper on the Transparency Initiative centred on a ‘lack of
information about the lobbyists active at EU level, includ-
ing the financial resources which they have at their dis-
posal’ (European Commission, 2006, p. 6).
The drivers of the ETI were publicly said to be the
democratic need for trust and accountability in the EU
institutions (themes prominent in public discourse as the
EU constitutional referenda was rejected in France and
the Netherlands in 2005). The normative assumptions
that underpin the register align with an elite pluralist
conception of EU public affairs (Coen, 2007). The logic
associatedwith the EU transparency register is that there
can only be accountability in public affairs if there is the
possibility of wider knowledge about lobbying. A public
register opens up contacts between the institutions and
outside interests to scrutiny by media, civil society, and
indeed the wider lobbying community. The ETI, which
rhetorically at least evokes thewider EUpublic,must also
be seen as part of a response tomore local criticism from
within the Brussels bubble (emanating from someMEPs,
Ombudsmen, civil society watchdog groups as well as
some national Eurosceptic media) about transparency
and accountability deficits at the heart of European poli-
tics and governance.
Nevertheless, the ETI came somewhat out of the
blue, and reportedly surprised some senior Barroso
Commissioners in respect of its reach and ambition.
Politics and Governance, 2021, Volume 9, Issue 1, Pages 237–247 237
Prior to the ETI, debate around lobbying influence in
Brussels was confined to the pages of the European
Voice, reflecting a sporadic dialogue between civil soci-
ety groups, the lobbying consultant associations and a
few MEPs and academics. There were differing views
about who might wield lobbying influence, with some
observers noting growing corporate power in Brussels
(Balanyá, Doherty, Hoedeman, Ma’anit, & Wesselius,
2003; van Apeldoorn, 2005) while others suggesting a
lobbying free-for-all where civil society organisations
(CSOs) are prominent (Greenwood, 2002). Different fig-
ures were bandied about to make the case for and
against the need for reform. Estimates of the number of
lobbyists active in Brussels before the ETI varied greatly:
There are around 1,400 EU level interest groups for-
mally constituted in law, of which two-thirds are busi-
ness and one-fifth public interest groups….To these
can be added large firms (around 350 are estimated
to be active at the EU level), commercial public affairs
players, a number of national business interest associ-
ations active in engaging EU decision making, and an
array of informal network structures…approaching
20,000 interest units which have accepted the need
to engage EU politics in some way. (Greenwood,
2002, p. 431)
Included within the estimate of 20,000 interests are
national level organisations across Europe with some
interest in EU level public affairs. An official esti-
mate produced by the European Parliament identified
some 2000 organisations with a presence in down-
town Brussels (European Parliament, 2003). Civil soci-
ety groups suggested some 15,000 active lobbyists in
Brussels (Corporate Europe Observatory, 2003, p. 8).
The inability to even agree on the broad estimates of the
numbers of lobbyists in Brussels was a telling sign of a
lack of transparency and intelligibility of EU public affairs
(for a detailed discussion of the methodological issues
associated with estimating the EU lobbying universe see
Berkhout & Lowery, 2008), especially to those outside
the Brussels bubble.
2. European Lobbying Transparency: Key Trends,
Themes and Tensions
The analysis that follows will focus on the challenges
of increasing lobbying transparency in Europe, and the
related question of monitory democracy in a European
polity that in many senses lacks an organic and engaged
demos. This relates to the nature of the European public
sphere and the difficulties in securing critical publicity,
democratic accountability, and reaching wider European
public opinion. The argument presented here is that elite
lobbying networks in Brussels and their communicative
interactions within what might be termed the Brussels
bubble can be seen as a significant constituent part of
the actually existing European public sphere. This is not
widely recognised in literatures on media and political
communication in Europe, nor indeed in literatures dis-
cussing disclosure and lobbying transparency.
The Commission has long played an active role in
developing and financially supporting various policy com-
munities in its orbit. Indeed, in a landmark statement
nearly three decades ago the Commission signalled its
receptiveness to outside interests:
The Commission has always been an institution
open to outside input. The Commission believes
this process to be fundamental to the development
of its policies. This dialogue has proved valuable
to both the Commission and to interested outside
parties. Commission officials acknowledge the need
for such outside input and welcome it. (European
Commission, 1992)
In the wake of the Single European Act the incentives to
lobby Brussels directly increased significantly (see Chari
& Kritzinger, 2006). Since the 1990s there has been a bur-
geoning lobbying sector in Brussels. This crowded and
competitive lobbying environment comprises in-house
corporate lobbyists, trade and business associations, lob-
bying consultancies, law firms, think tanks and public
relations agencies, as well as civil society networks, indi-
vidual NGOs and governmental as well as regional rep-
resentative organisations. In this context outside inter-
ests have developed their lobbying strategies to account
for the changing terrain in Brussels, and ‘have matured
into sophisticated interlocutors that often have more
awareness of inter institutional differences than the func-
tionaries they lobby’ (Coen, 2007, p. 4). Commenting
on the expansion of lobbying and advocacy in Brussels,
Coen (2007) observes what he terms an elite pluralist
arrangement. To achieve good access for direct lobby-
ing of the Commission—the primary focus—large firms
were encouraged to develop a broad political profile
across a number of issues and to participate in the cre-
ation of collective political strategies. Accordingly, the
cost of identity building would be discounted against bet-
ter access to “company specific” issues at a later forumor
Committee. As such, ‘lobbyist[s] themselves recognised
the importance of reputation building as a Brussels lob-
bying strategy’ (Coen, 2007, pp. 7–9). Concerns about
reputation and image are not incidental, as they relate
to the perceived legitimacy of lobbying and are seen
by actors as creating necessary licence to operate and
room for manoeuvre in building public affairs coalitions
and campaigns that may be needed for lobbying the
EU institutions.
The gravitation of different outside interests to
Brussels coincided with the Commission’s strategic
rethink on governance, including how relations with out-
side interests could best be organised. The White Paper
on Governance (2001) addressed lofty concepts like a
“citizens’ Europe,” which in practicewould be reflected in
increased consultation with civil society and promoting
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political participation, as well as the democratisation
of expertise and input into planning, regulation and
decision making (European Commission, 2001). These
themes have run through deliberation and advocacy on
lobbying transparency in Brussels ever since. Before the
advent of the ETI some influential business organisa-
tions were promoting a new system of managing rela-
tions between the EU institutions and outside inter-
ests, which would effectively debar those organisations
and networks funded by the EU institutions from lobby-
ing or having representative status (Greenwood, 2007).
This recommendation was widely seen as a direct attack
on some of the more critical voices in civil society in
Brussels, which had been calling for greater corporate
accountability and increased environmental and con-
sumer protections.
However, the question of EU funding and sponsor-
ship of outside organisations does not simply apply to
a few high-profile NGOs. Other key stakeholders in the
debate around lobbying transparency in Europe are also
implicated. Public relations and public affairs agencies
are hired by the Commission to execute communica-
tion campaigns in various member states, and indeed
across the entire EU. These same agencies are also
hired by private clients to make representations on their
behalf to the Commission. They help draft responses to
consultation documents, as well as more precise work
drafting specific amendments to legislation. While many
non-governmental organizations in Brussels that lobby
the Commission on a range of policy issues are also
(in part) funded by the Commission, this applies to some
of the major think tanks in Brussels as well. Thus, there
are multiple commercial and interpersonal connections
between political actors that occupy ‘premium’ commu-
nicative space at the centre of decision-making and leg-
islative power in Europe. As such, the ETI proposals to
open up some of these connections and contacts to
wider public scrutiny unsurprisingly provoked a number
of defensive responses from the lobbying industry.
The debate prompted by the launch of the ETI in
March 2005 and throughout the official consultation in
2006–2007 quickly brought a number of key issues into
focus, centring onwho andwhat should be captured by a
lobbying register. The proper disclosure of financial infor-
mation on lobbying expenditure and information relat-
ing to the details of lobbying activity were debated. Law
firms and lobbying consultants were initially resistant to
disclosure of client information, pleading for some ele-
ment of client confidentiality to be recognised in the dis-
closure regime.While it soonbecame clear that promises
of robust self-regulation would be insufficient to assuage
the Commission, the lobbying associations continued to
fight a rear-guard up to the launch of the register in
2008. A novel feature of the proposed transparency reg-
ister was the inclusion of think tanks, recognising their
significant role in facilitating direct and indirect lobby-
ing in Brussels. In this context indirect lobbying refers to
those activities that do not include face-to-face advocacy
and interest representation, and may include lobbying
research, intelligence gathering, analysis and the produc-
tion of opinion pieces that shape wider policy discourse.
Some of the long-established Brussels-based think tanks
(Bruegel, Centre for European Policy Studies, also often
contractingwith the EU institutions) had privately consid-
ered offering some form of self-regulation of their activ-
ities to avoid capture in the lobbying register, but that
idea failed to gain any traction and was quietly shelved.
But the status of the register itself, and its legal
foundations, are significant. A central theme of debate
around lobbying transparency in Brussels has been
the issue of mandatory versus voluntary disclosure.
Transparency advocates have consistently pushed for
an all-encompassing mandatory regime, with detailed
financial disclosures, to be placed on a statutory footing.
The commercial lobbing sector, and some trade associa-
tions and in-house lobbyists have resisted detailed finan-
cial disclosure and argued for a self-regulatory system.
The Transparency Register launched in 2008 reflected
a compromise on these positions: financial disclosures
were organised within differential bands for consul-
tancies and private companies (whereas NGOs were
required to report overall turnover), and lobbyists did
not need to specify the focus or goals of their lobbying
activity, but instead were invited to disclose policy areas
of interest to lobbyists. All this informationwas disclosed
on a voluntary basis as the register does not have a statu-
tory underpinning.
Civil society groups promoting lobbying disclosure
produced an analysis of the lobbying register after its first
year in operation. The criticisms in the report (ALTER EU,
2009) point to some loop-holes in the Commission’s sys-
tem, with the coverage and reliability of data in the reg-
ister questioned. Initially less than 1500 organisations
registered, as many of Brussels’s largest consultancies,
law firms, companies and think tanks declined to dis-
close any lobbying information. It quickly became appar-
ent that the office managing the Register of Interest
Representatives had little resource to check the accuracy
of filings, meaning that disclosures were published with
effectively no oversight.
Friends of the Earth Europe published an analysis of
the corporate declarations in the EU lobbying register in
advance of the introduction of a joint Commission and
Parliament effort to standardise lobbying transparency.
The report compared the disclosures of some of the
largest transnational corporations in Europe who were
also actively lobbying in the US (where the disclosure sys-
tem is mandatory and data is more granular than that
required in Europe). They concluded ‘that EU companies
are either failing to declare their lobby spend or under-
estimating it in the register. Were the register manda-
tory, it would be far easier to see the true scale of lob-
bying activities in the EU’ (Friends of the Earth Europe,
2010, p. 10).
A data scrape of the Lobbying Register from June
2009 reveals a very mixed picture: 5693 organisations
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had registered at this point (a slightly higher figure than
someof the literature suggests; see Crepaz, Chari, Hogan,
& Murphy, 2019, p. 52), with 3404 identifying them-
selves as in-house lobbyists; 1472 organisationswere cat-
egorised as NGO/think tanks, yet on closer inspection
there were very few think tanks in this sample, andmany
trade associations and business associations chose to
categorise themselves as NGOs. Only 365 consultancies
registered. Moreover, 1807 of the organisations in the
database claimed not to be active at the European level.
The first iterations of the EU’s lobbying register were
owned and designed by the Commission. In what might
be termed an experimental early phase of European
lobbying registration (2008–2011) the regulatory frame-
work was still in formation, with various outside inter-
ests seeking to shape the reach and teeth of the regime.
As well as the focus on the legal framework (and the
potential for associated sanctions) the question of finan-
cial information disclosure recurred. Partly this was a
result of advocacy from pro-transparency groups, but
the comments of Siim Kallas, the Commissioner who
then held the portfolio for lobbying related issues, clearly
illustrates the core concerns: ‘Nobody would pay real
money for lobby services without expecting something
in return—and that “something” is influence’ (Kallas,
2007). Yet the official recognition of the significance of
resources devoted to lobbying would not easily translate
into disclosure metrics that might be readily understood
by scholars, media, watchdogs or interested publics.
While these debates might seem like a minor his-
torical footnote, they nevertheless helped shape the
limits and purposes of the lobbying disclosure system
in Europe today. The available literature on interest
representation in Europe until relatively recently has
been populated by sectoral network analyses, narrowly
defined case studies, speculative theorisations, norma-
tive best practice reviews or synthesis studies that rely on
whatwould appear to be largely aggregated or unreliable
data (Berkhout & Lowery, 2008). The literature that now
exists on lobbying regulation specifically (Bunea, 2019;
Chalmers, 2013; Chari, Hogan, Murphy, & Crepaz, 2019;
Crepaz et al., 2019; Greenwood & Dreger, 2013; Holman
& Luneberg, 2012) allows for some agreedmetrics to fos-
ter comparison between different systems. Such work
ranks the EU system as a medium-regulated system.
In 2008, a joint working group between the European
Parliament and the Commission began preparations for
an inter-institutional agreement (IIA) on lobbying regu-
lation, which passed in 2011 giving birth to the Joint
Transparency Register. This voluntary scheme required
lobbyists to disclose information about their activities,
in much the same manner as the trial register had
gathered and included publication of client and net-
work relationships relevant to public affairs. However,
the system lacked clear sanctions and continued to be
hampered by lack of resources to verify disclosures,
and widespread avoidance by many significant lobbying
organisations (indeed the reticence of major law firms
active in public affairs and regulatory advice to partici-
pate in the register continues to this day). A concerted
civil society campaign to secure mandatory lobbying reg-
ulation continued, which sought to expose the shortcom-
ings of the IIA approach favoured by the Commission
(ALTER EU, 2014). Other analyses judged the Register
more kindly, deeming it a qualified success: ‘There are
now more than 5500 individual entries….We estimate
that around three-quarters of business-related organi-
sations active in engaging EU political institutions are
in the Register and around 60 percent of NGOs with
a European interest are in the Register’ (Greenwood &
Dreger, 2013, p. 159). By current disclosure data this
assessment looks to have underestimated the lobbying
universe, but it does recognise the growing reach of
the register. A related concern in public affairs circles
in Brussels was the trajectory of transparency measures,
with concerns being raised about emerging rules to gov-
ern conflicts of interest, revolving doors, the composi-
tion of expert input on various advisory and regulatory
bodies: ‘The latter are still evolving in a process of incre-
mental, though lumpy, development, often following the
interjection of civil society watchdogs, sometimes with
the support of a European Ombudsman’ (Greenwood &
Dreger, 2013, p. 141).
A new IIA in 2014 created what was termed a
de facto mandatory lobbying register. The Commission
was under pressure from the European Parliament (and
some external stakeholders) to make the Transparency
Register mandatory, but resisted that approach, prefer-
ring instead to increase pressure on outside organisa-
tions to sign up to the register by adopting and pub-
licising a series of soft sanctions. The key incentive to
boost compliancewas the Juncker Commission pledge to
onlymeetwith registered lobbyists and to publish details
of contacts with organisations and individuals in bilat-
eral meetings, including disclosing the topics discussed
(European Commission, 2015). These policies promoted
a notable spike in registrations (see Figure 1), although
the commitment appears not to be consistently applied.
In essence, without a legislative underpinning the regis-
ter will also be vulnerable to non-compliance. The soft
power efforts to encourage registration have had some
impact, but without a robust and consistently applied
applied policy to decline meetings and briefings with
outside interests not participating in the transparency
scheme the limits of a voluntary approach appear to have
been reached. The European Parliament also called on
the Commission to submit a legislative proposal to under-
pin a mandatory lobbying register by the end of 2016.
That process appears to have stalled, and both institu-
tions have shown little political appetite to move this for-
ward and deal with the exclusion of the Council from the
current arrangements.
A notable aspect of the development and expansion
of the current European lobbying transparency system
has been the role of civil society in making the case for
reform, demonstrating the short-comings of the various
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Figure 1. Evolution of transparency registrations. Source: Joint Transparency Register Secretariat (2021).
systems to promote lobbying transparency: ‘Acting as
norm entrepreneurs that by default politicise their lobby-
ing, they add to the breadth and participatory character
of the decision-making process’ (Coen & Katsaitis, 2019,
p. 281). Scholars have identified gaps in knowledge and
information relating to ‘under-researched third-party
groups thatmay have an impact on policy outcomes, and
[reaffirm] the need to track lobbying footprints at the
cycle’s earlier stages’ (Coen, Lehmann, & Katsaitis, 2020,
p. 2) and the continuing lack information around profes-
sional lobbying advisors:
We note that we know surprisingly little about the
activity of the third largest group of interests in the
EU, professional consultancies…future research that
assesses their activity on a per file basis can offer valu-
able insight into the EU lobbying universe.’ (Coen &
Katsaitis, 2019, p. 289)
One could add to this list the virtual invisibility of law
firms engaged in lobbying, and the lobbying dynam-
ics that may impact of the composition and work of
expert groups.
The review of the origins and evolution of the current
lobbying disclosure system in Brussels offers an infor-
mational baseline. Much of the scholarship on lobbying
transparency and interest group activity has focused on
the governance dimension, and what information is dis-
closed, or the informational exchanges between stake-
holders. There has been a rather striking general lack of
interest or curiosity about how such information can be
circulated, communicated andmademorewidely known
via media, networks and platforms (Naurin, 2006, 2007).
Thismissing element is a key factor in assessing the limits
of transparency to which we must now turn attention.
3. A European Public Sphere or a Brussels Bubble?
The Case of Lobbying
There are strong normative and rationalist ideas that suf-
fuse debate on lobbying transparency. One common line
of reasoning is that lobbying transparency makes infor-
mation publicly available, which aids public understand-
ing of politics, scrutiny of legislative processes and there-
fore boosts accountability. This logic leans heavily on
the media acting as a fourth estate, and also assumes
that there is a watching and interested public, or in the
European case, publics. It is also a model that is perhaps
not easily transposed onto the complicated institutional
and decision-making arrangements in Brussels. Another
line of argument around lobbying transparency is that it
makes the lobbying processmore visible to political insid-
ers and that visibility promotes probity and adherence to
the rules of the game.
Using the conceptual lens of the public sphere the
argument presented here considers how lobbying can
be made more transparent and therefore accountable.
To do this the discussion first focuses on how the con-
cept of the public sphere is often very media centric.
As a corrective to such approaches the Brussels lobbying
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scene comprising elite professional networks of commu-
nication is discussed. These networks can be considered
as part of the European public sphere. They are formally
outside of the political institutions but orbit them very
closely. The interactions between lobbyists, elected rep-
resentatives and bureaucrats within these networks are
not widely reported on by the news media, and are not
easily captured in the Transparency Register, yet these
appear to be the very stuff of public affairs and political
communication in Brussels and would appear to be virtu-
ally unknown to wider European publics.
In respect to the argument around media as fourth
estate, the empirical evidence suggests that the media
are not much interested in reporting on the European
lobbying register. This does not mean that the media are
not interested in reporting on lobbying, but that there
appears to be little newsworthy in the Transparency
Register if coverage of its contents, or acknowledgement
of the register as a source for the media, are indicators
(see Table 1). This may be a product of the lag in publica-
tion of timely information in the register, or indeed the
content of the disclosures themselves. A cursory inspec-
tion of lobbying disclosures on the Transparency Register
would not likely yield front page headlines. Nevertheless,
the broad patterns of media coverage of the register
are illustrative.
What media coverage there is can be said to be
largely Anglophone, largely online, and largely speaking
to specialist or niche audiences. The lack of newspa-
per coverage of the Transparency Register suggests it is
not yet perceived as a news-worthy source for media.
Of these news items around 20% rely on comments
and contextualisation by civil society groups. What is
known about media coverage of lobbying is that it is
often related to scandals and wrong-doing. The US is per-
haps an exception to this, as media coverage of lobby-
ing expenditure is a staple of policy analysis in the qual-
ity press and online outlets. This is possible because of a
much more robust and granular lobbying disclosure sys-
tem. So, one of the key limiting factors in media cover-
age of lobbying in Europe is the nature of the regulatory
regime and the information that can be made available
to the public through official transparency mechanisms.
But the role of the media merits some consideration too,
especially as it relates to the unique political space that
is Brussels.
There has been considerable scholarly and policy
interest in the European public sphere over the last
two decades (Eriksen, 2005; Fossum& Schlesinger, 2007;
Gil de Zúñiga, 2015; Risse, 2015; Walter, 2017). Much
of the academic debate on the creation, or indeed very
existence, of a European public sphere is loaded with
theoretical and normative assumptions about the desir-
ability and possibility of a common European commu-
nicative space as ameans to nurturing a shared European
identity, thereby bolstering a wider political project of
European integration (Baisnee, 2007; Schlesinger, 2003;
Schlesinger & Kevin, 2000).
The European public sphere can include mass media,
but it must also include specialised media (Baisnee,
2007), dealing with discrete policy issues and serving
select audiences, including lobbyists. To really capture
the dynamics of EU public affairs the perspectivemust be
wider again. To account for communications rather than
simply media, one must focus on other places where
such communication occurs. Social media platforms are
an obvious starting point and are easily accessible to
those not based in Brussels. It is not clear if social media
data yet offers a useful or reliable form of data to under-
stand EU level lobbying dynamics. It is being used by
scholars to try to map public affairs networks and dis-
courses (Hobbs, Della Bosca, Schlosberg, & Sun, 2020).
Research on the shape and functioning of the
European public sphere(s) too often takes media
(Gripsrud, 2007) and media coverage of EU affairs as
synonymous with the European public sphere (Trenz,
2004). A useful corrective to such approaches is to begin
to examine the actual functioning of political commu-
nication in Europe from the perspective of issue or
interest-based networks (Eriksen, 2005), overlapping
Table 1.Media coverage of European Transparency Register, from 1 January 2011 to 1 December 2020.
Transparency Register (en) Registre de transparence (fr) Transparenz-Register (de)
TOTAL 1619 205 82
Newswires & press releases 747 24 7
Web-based publications 505 27 12
Newspapers 212 43 38
Newsletters 33 18 0
Industry trade press 24 26 2
Legal news 16 0 0
Weblinks 13 3 0
Magazines and journals 12 33 7
News transcripts 2 2 15
Source: Author’s search of the Nexis news database (https://advance.lexis.com), by Europe region, for search terms in quotes, all lan-
guage publications (high similarity duplicates removed). Some categories of publications removed, e.g., aggregate news sources, video,
audio, undefined.
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communicative communities and networks (Schlesinger,
2003) or sources rather than media (Davis, 2007; Dinan
& Miller, 2009). Much of the existing literature reflects
a ‘tendency to present public spheres as free-floating
communicative spaces, abstracted from the colonisa-
tion of public-political deliberation by state and corpo-
rate actors under conditions of neoliberal hegemony’
(Stavinoha, 2020, p. 5).
Shifting the emphasis to communication networks
and the sources of political communication, allows actu-
ally existing European public spheres to come into focus
more clearly. The approach taken here starts by exam-
ining the communicative agency of policy actors, par-
ticularly elite communicators (those whose business is
the business of European public affairs, which would
include journalists, lobbyists, and those in expert policy
networks, including think tanks), in explaining and under-
standing the character of political communication and
public affairs in the EU. The extent to which lobbyists
target mass, or specialist, media or focus more specifi-
cally on elite discussion and decision-making fora is an
empirical question. In practice it is clear that a model
that only considers the public or published forms of polit-
ical communication in Europe misses large swathes of
the actually existing European public sphere, created by
the activity of elite communicators acting toward what
might be termed “strong publics” (Eriksen & Fossum,
2002), that is the governance networks surrounding the
EU institutions.
Baisnee (2007) argues for a newapproach to studying
political communication in Europe that moves beyond
standard research designs based on discourse analyses
of media content to a more sophisticated and ethno-
graphically informedunderstanding of European commu-
nicative space:
Anyone who has spent some time in Brussels
knows that an incredible amount of political activity
occurs, including almost daily demonstrations, pub-
lic debates, etc. The fact that they do not appear in
national newspapers does not mean that they never
happened. (Baisnee, 2007, p. 499)
One can readily appreciate that those interested in that
range of political activity not well served by mainstream
media will usually be a select demographic, a niche
within a niche of political anoraks and those whose job
it is to follow and be informed about EU affairs. While
elite media do serve their audiences with a digest of
news about key legislation and policy-making in Brussels
(Corcoran & Fahy, 2009; Schlesinger & Kevin, 2000),
this is actually still a very small part of political com-
munication in the European public sphere (Hänska &
Bauchowitz, 2019; Hepp et al., 2016). Where else should
we look? Schlesinger argues oneway tomove this debate
forward is ‘to analyse emergent European communica-
tive spaces’ and if this is accepted then logically ‘the
focus needs to shift to the new, supranational arenas
and their constituent publics’ (Schlesinger, 2003, p. 11).
Baisnee (2007, p. 501) suggests a focus on ‘the social
groups actively involved in the debates over the EU
and EU policies.’ The analysis of the European public
sphere cannot simply be restricted to news media and
must account for the various forms of political commu-
nication produced, circulated, contested and consumed
by different actors and publics, in different media, fora
and networks.
One way to reframe the European public sphere is
to compress the space and consider political communi-
cation as it exists in the locale of the euro quartiér in
Brussels. This aligns with work championing the spatial
turn in communications studies (Falkheimer & Jansson,
2006) that draws attention to the significance of place
and space in communicative activity, though many appli-
cations of this work are essentially concerned with medi-
ated communications. We can accept the spatial turn
and focus on Brussels as a site of elite communica-
tion, populated by a variety of political actors, includ-
ing newsmedia, both general and specialist, Commission
officials and spokespersons, elected representatives, lob-
byists, public relations professionals, and think tanks,
all of whom routinely interact in the daily business of
European political communication, and many of whom
are directly concerned with lobbying and public affairs.
Davis’ (2007) work on media sources suggests exam-
ining ‘the micro and less visible forms of communica-
tion at these sites, and on the private actions of pow-
erful individuals’ (Davis, 2007, p. 10). It also suggests
that researching the public sphere can become a ques-
tion of communications and power rather than simply a
question of the role of mass media institutions embed-
ded within power relations. The latter fails to account
for the submerged but significant political communica-
tions activities of lobbyists, think tanks and policy plan-
ning organizations.
The routine business of lobbying and public affairs
also includes conferences, workshops, EU affairs training
events, breakfast briefings, lunchtime seminars and din-
ner debates, aswell as pseudo-events like book launches,
and the activities of cross parliamentary groups, all
of which create spaces where political communicators
come together to discuss policy, to share information, to
hear representations and argument, to lobby and nego-
tiate consensus and dissensus. This is the substance of
the actually existing European public sphere in Brussels.
How are such networks and their impacts to be made
visible? This is a challenge for transparency campaign-
ers, media and indeed scholarship. In the case of the
latter much work under the banner of political commu-
nication defaults to drawing on mass media and more
recently socialmedia as data. There is certainly a need for
the use of field methods to complement mass and social
media, plus analyses of trade publications, websites and
data scraping public registers (e.g., in Europe a trans-
parency mosaic could include the Transparency Register,
Commission disclosures of high level lobbying meetings,
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the Commission database of expert groups, as well as
data from national lobbying registers, and national level
FOI disclosures; see Miller & Dinan, 2016), to triangu-
late as many different sources across the public sphere
to offer a more complete account of policy deliberation
and discussion.
It appears that this European public sphere is for-
mally open and accessible, if you can pay the often pricey
entrance fee, to various commercial conferences and
eventswhere the business of EU governance is discussed.
The “staging” of the public sphere, through conferences,
discussion fora, expert meetings, publicity stunts and
other events has become something of a lucrative side-
line in Brussels for many communications companies
and think tanks. The cost of participation should not
be underestimated. Maintaining an active presence in
Brussels is a real barrier to entry in terms of the aggre-
gation of memberships fees to political groups and trade
associations, think tank networks and attending elite
commercial policy conferences has arguably created a
new bourgeois public sphere. Part of this cost is captured
in the lobbying Transparency Register, where organisa-
tions are asked to declare their membership of different
networks and coalitions. Another feature of this space is
that it is almost exclusively occupied by actors who are
committed to the European project and are aligned to
free market principles. If you want to have any impact
and build effective political coalitions in Brussels you
must at least be pro-European—this is tacitly understood
as a key feature of the culture by all those participating
in the “Brussels bubble” (Laurens, 2018). Examining the
communicative action of political actors also illuminates
the close interrelationships between the Commission
and communicators in its orbit. Many actors work on
behalf of, and towards, the institutions—they represent
and make representations to the very bodies at the cen-
tre of legislative power in Europe.
It is therefore useful to conceptualise this environ-
ment in terms of a specialised and politicised commu-
nicative space, where a range of political communicators
(lobbyists, think tanks, journalists, NGOs, advisers, offi-
cials and elected representatives) interact and engage
in policy dialogue. This public sphere is dominated by
sources somewhat removed from an overseeing or over-
hearing public and displays some of the disembed-
ded tendencies others have noted in elite communica-
tions circuits characterized by ‘professionalized commu-
nications, cultures and associated elite networks which
exclude journalists’ (Davis, 2007, p. 174). There is weak
external scrutiny and little critical publicity (for a related
discussion of publicity in EUaffairs and role of civil society
see Neyer, 2004, pp. 32–33). This shapes the communica-
tive logic of the Brussels bubble and contributes to what
has been characterized as its elite pluralism.
Civil society advocacy has been seen to act as a sur-
rogate for the expression of public opinion in Brussels
and elected representatives are more likely to articulate
public interest arguments on issues where civil society
is active and where the issue has high public salience.
‘The involvement of business lobbyists…seems to be a
countervailing force within politicization, constraining
the prevalence of public interests in EU policy debates’
(De Bruycker, 2017, p. 616). Politicians appear to be less
likely to articulate public interests on issues with low
public salience and where business lobbies are active.
It is important to note that there is considerable variety
and divergence across civil society in Brussels, and CSOs
can be located across the political spectrum from left to
right. What they have in common, at least in a normative
sense, is:
CSOs are reaching out from the grass roots to remote
Brussels and thus bring people’s interests into the
decision-making process. As a partner in governance,
they are expected to voice the diversity of inter-
ests and views and to bring the knowledge and
down-to-earth experience of citizens into the policy-
making process. In other words, they are expected
to contribute both to input and output legitimacy.
(Kohler-Koch, 2010, p. 106)
The public are largely excluded from this space, which
adds weight to the idea that a lobbying register exists to
serve an already super-served public—those profession-
als clustered around the European quarter in Brussels,
and those across Europe virtually engaged in public
affairs. There is some evidence to suggest that lobby-
ing registers are most keenly monitored by lobbyists
and policy-makers themselves, providing increased trans-
parency for those inside the lobbying milieu (Crepaz,
2020; Rush, 1998). Equally, it could be reasonably
claimed that the register has failed to make lobbying
transparent to thewider public. This sits at odds with the
founding rhetoric of lobbying reform in Brussels, which
was to boost trust and participation. Participation and
popular mobilisation around issues at the EU level is very
rare, a recent exception being widespread opposition
to TTIP which featured concerns about official secrecy
and the lack of transparency associated with the puta-
tive negotiation of that trade deal (Coremans, 2017).
The TTIP case ‘is reflective of the historically engrained
institutional ambivalence towards public political partici-
pation in EU affairs’ (Stavinoha, 2020, p. 4) and illustrates
some limits to the EU institutions appetite for increasing
publicity (Naurin, 2007; Neyer, 2004). Moreover, despite
being proclaimed as the most transparent trade deal
ever, in practice there was the usual secrecy around
the negotiations. Interestingly, Stavinoha’s (2020) analy-
sis of TTIP was in part only possible by using Freedom
of Information requests to access documents that would
otherwise not have been published.
For the Commission:
Transparency is primarily aimed at fostering citizens’
trust by allowing them to understand what is being
negotiated. For CSOs, transparency is just a stepping-
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stone that should allow citizens (through CSOs) to
meaningfully participate in the negotiations, and only
this can bring about trust.’ (Gheyle & De Ville, 2017,
pp. 23–24)
The parallels between the TTIP case and the limits to lob-
bying transparency are quite striking. The issue of lobby-
ing disclosure in Europe would not have been addressed
without pressure from civil society. Many involved in this
issue simply see lobbying transparency as a necessary
first step to developing a more responsive (to wider pub-
lic opinion) and accountable European polity. The NGOs
and campaign groups in Brussels active on the issue of
lobbying transparency can be considered as a surrogate
for the missing mass media. Civil society groups inter-
ested in good governance and disclosure contribute to
monitory democracy (Keane, 2018) and form part of a
watchdogmediamatrix around lobbying. They have used
web and social media to publicise concerns about privi-
leged access, conflicts of interest, and corporate capture,
which are now part of the public lobbying issue culture in
Brussels. In some respects, these campaign groups have
made the issue of lobbying more visible and more pub-
lic than it would otherwise be. Their continued activism
on this agenda will be a factor in determining the wider
public reach and understanding of European lobbying
transparency, whatever new mandatory arrangements
are agreed by the institutions.
4. Conclusion
The limits of European lobbying transparency are a fac-
tor of the interplay of formal and informal drivers of
disclosure: the types of information disclosed in the
register and the available sanctions for non-disclosure
are of course very significant. However, the existing
political opportunity structures and the communicative
spaces and networks that orbit Brussels politics, and are
connected to national capitals and public spheres, are
also important.
It is likely that the evolution of the transparency
regime in Brussels will be shaped by a combination
of political appetite, imagination and pressure from
advocates of transparency and good governance. One
of the universal lessons on all lobbying disclosure sys-
tems is that many lobbyists are not very enthusias-
tic about increased regulation. The tensions between
public and private interests would suggest that with
an issue community chronically or constitutionally inca-
pable of self-regulation political pressure is needed to
drive reform. Previous best guesses have been shown
to under-estimate the population of lobbying organi-
sations active on the EU level. Without being able to
accurately identify what actors are engaged in lobby-
ing there is little prospect of meaningful accountability
for them, or for those they interact with. A mandatory
system may help address this and create a transparent
and more robust disclosure system. However, the stalled
inter-institutional process suggests that such a system is
not in the offing.
The resources to publish and update a database of
lobbying spending and activity, as undertaken by the
OpenSecrets project of the Centre for Responsive Politics
in the US, is being developed in the EU at present.
The LobbyFacts project, which draws on the EU trans-
parency register and data published by the Commission
onhigh levelmeetingswith lobbyists seeks to allow some
tracking of lobbying trends and activities in Brussels.
Nevertheless, the detail of the data in the LobbyFacts
database is comparatively thinner thanwhat is published
in OpenSecrets, mainly due to differences in the level of
detailed disclosure in Brussels and Washington, with the
latter a mandatory system with specific requirements
regarding lobbying expenditure disclosure and signifi-
cant penalties for non-compliance. Therefore, the ability
of media to explain EU public affairs and how influence
is exerted in Brussels is severely curtailed. The available
evidence suggests that watchdog groups are likely to
remain key actors in promoting awareness of lobbying
transparency and building pressure for reform.
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